+++final draft version+++
Dear reader,
in the immediate aftermath of the Paris attacks the relationship between upholding a certain political correctness and errors in efficient counter-terrorism was described here (Ger) back in November. The previous blog entry was in German since the mass influx of people into Northern Europe was mainly inspired by German government's decision to take all of them in and then seek assistance of other EU member states for redistributing them across Europe.
If one thing is clear in the wake of the tragedy in Paris which claimed the loss of 130 lives it is that there's absolute no room for error in effective measures against perpetrators of those atrocities. There is no room for error in prevention strategies and certainly not when it's clear that such an attack is ongoing. The latter may be easier to counter since at least the time and place of the attack is known, but similar shootings in different parts of the world made clear that authorities contributed to the high number of casualties by acting either too slowly or incompetently or both.
Whenever it's clear that it is not a 'classical' hostage situation where the kidnappers typically try to extort authorities in order to achieve some kind of a deal, a quick and decisive response is of the essence. Every extra minute that the attackers get to make use of their weapons will likely contribute to higher number of casualties. One should assume that this simple fact is known to the authorities, but there are enough examples from the past where national authorities failed to take out the perpetrator(s) quickly enough. A few examples will be given in the blog post.
We, the public, are often enough deceived by the 'rosy picture' those action movies from Hollywood paint, where authorities usually have both: a plan in the drawer with every eventuality planned already in advance, and special operation forces which are capable of fulfilling their objective. In such movies, which form our opinions more than 'realities on the ground' in most, if not all, cases the 'good guys' thus - the authorities - win by either capturing or killing the attackers.
We mustn't assume that entertainment from Hollywood describes reality like journalism does, in fact it reflects rather wishful thinking. When it comes to effective counter-terrorism measures in the future a thorough look into what went wrong in the past is necessary. The objective is not to put blame on individuals, or even try to punish them by e.g. drastically reducing their pensions, but instead the objective should be to learn how to avoid repeating their mistakes. In the past those have unfortunately been repeated over and over again by a common refusal to draw conclusions from previous failed operations from almost every corner of the world where exactly such things, or at least similar ones, happened. A continuation of such a refusal would most likely result in further loss of life and would therefore in a way assist future assailants.
All kinds of things went wrong in the past: from planning security measures accompanying public mass gatherings/events to e.g. maintenance issues regarding transport equipment such as helicopters.
As it was described earlier PC must be eliminated completely from security related issues, especially nowadays where the classic hostage situation almost seems to be a thing of the distant past and now thugs with the sole intention to kill as many people of all ethnic or religious backgrounds has become the grim reality. Of course there must also some kind of strategy implemented which tries to prevent that kind of radicalization at least in the future, but in order to address the immediate necessities of law enforcement and protection of the public it's necessary to eliminate as many sources of errors as possible.
Speaking of PC and security preparations for public events: it's a good start to remind present generations that the casualties of the 1972 Olympic games in Munich might have been brought down to zero, if not that many mistakes would have been made by German authorities from the very beginning. There was expertise given by analysts who studied the PLO's MO (modus operandi) at the time and who were able to predict the exact method and timing of the attackers [¹], who entered the compound of the athletes. There expertise was dismissed by the organizing committee which instead preferred to pursuit their 'happy games' without much security around the athletes and the public at the games. As often in such circumstances the opinions expressed by the experts wasn't dismissed with facts and arguments but by ridiculing the author in gatherings of the games' organizing committee.
There have been numerous other mistakes by the local and national authorities of the time. It started with a ridiculous security in place. or rather the lack of it, at the entrances,exists and fences of the Olympic village. So first the athletes themselves made use of the security lapses by e.g. entering the compound unchecked via the exit or by climbing over the fence (Some athletes enjoyed the company of their spouses during the night). Methods also used only days later by the attackers' recon team and finally the hostage taker gang consisting of eight individuals.
One small one detail was as crucial as overlooked later: communication errors, where other authorities in a different, vital location had not been given proper information in order to prepare accordingly. This kind of communication error which didn't give authorities at the Fürstenfeldbruck airfield the proper number of kidnappers, later also happened in Cologne where the possible location of kidnapped chief of German employers association - Hans Martin Schleyer - was simply overlooked by coordinators of different investigation groups and the BKA.[³] The victim was later transferred from that address, which was never checked, to another location and since the federal government of Germany didn't meet the demands of the kidnappers they stepped up the pressure by ordering the kidnapping of a German airliner. There was also some communication mistake also in that operation to free the hostages on board of that airliner by using unencrypted wireless communication which was intercepted by a wireless monitoring expert in the MENA region [²] and was almost relayed to the media, before German special operation forces were able to free the hostages at Mogadishu airfield in Somalia.
The need for secure,undetectable mid-flight communication was highlighted once again only a few years later where the need to keep radio silence over enemy territory finally ended up in a disaster and foiled a rescue attempt during a major hostage crisis.
More recent mistakes by authorities in Norway and Kenya are based on failed transportation for law enforcement officials trying to counter attackers in remote areas. In Norway it was the lack of helicopter transport capacity at the time when the only chopper available to the police was out of action due to summer time and the helicopter pilots were off duty at the time.
source: The Guardian Feb 22 2015>>Norway owns a single police helicopter – and in July, the helicopter service was on holiday. As a consequence of new savings measures, there was no emergency crew cover at the height of the summer. The first pilot nonetheless reported for duty right after hearing about the bomb on the news. He was told he was not needed. Yet the emergency response unit requested use of the helicopter twice in the hour that followed.The squad was informed that the helicopter was unavailable, even though it was on the Tarmac, fully operational and ready to fly. Nor did the police take any steps to mobilise military helicopters or make use of civilian helicopter companies.<<
So the shooter who even called the authorities and challenged them to stop him before he killed scores of young people on Utoya island wasn't stop on time. An even more recent example is the failure of the Kenyan authorities to provide airlift capacities for forces stationed in the country's capital in order to reach a college complex in Garissa on time where attackers of the Somalian Shabaab militia slaughtered numerous students at that college.
source:The Telegraph Apr 15 2015>>The Cessna 208B, the only plane said to be big enough to transport the elite Recce squad and their equipment, left Nairobi for Mombasa at 7.30am.It only returned to the capital at 11.30am, six hours after the attack began and more than five hours after the Recce squad had been placed on standby to respond.It departed Nairobi for Garissa with the commandos on board at 12.30pm.<<
As a matter of fact all security operations should be scrutinized in order to find out the exact time used from getting the first information that an attack took place until the law enforcement and other staff arrived at the scene. As Western, but recently also Russian, tourists have been in the focus of terrorists who penetrated either tourism compounds or infrastructure used by the tourism industry such as airports a new, comprehensive assessment of all such major objects used by EU citizens should take place in close cooperation between tour operators, the countries and their security officials where those facilities are located and EU member states' organisations which are entrusted with national security to work out details of how to avoid attacks if possible and to limit the damage once such prevention attempts fail.
>>Amid praise for the staff, many were critical of the lack of security at the hotel, which had no armed officers on duty, despite the massacre at the Bardo museum in March and a string of battles between jihadists and security forces. “There was no security before,” said Sam. “I’ve been to Turkey, to Egypt, those countries have security,” she said.<<source: The Guardian Jun 27 2015
>>Tunisian president Beji Caid Essebsi called for a global strategy against terrorism <<source: Wikipedia
So it makes sense not only to implement a 'shoot to kill' policy in regard to those attackers whose only goal is to kill as many people as possible and who don't care to get killed themselves, but also to eliminate all factors within the authorities who are not just showing a lack of interest regarding improvements in terrorism response, but who see this plain focus on efficiency as a threat to their authority or their main objective so far: being politically correct. When we in Europe and elsewhere are facing individuals who have been programmed into killing machines such 'less gifted' kind of people within our security apparatus is giving the attackers the edge they need to fulfill their task. Please note:This isn't a call for a North Korean style purge either, rather a smooth and silent change.
A very significant mistake was made recently also by French law enforcement staff when they allowed a car with one of the suspects on his way back to Belgium identified only later as a suspect to continue his movement away from Paris where the attacks took place. Unaware of the exact identity of the attackers, 'circumstantial evidence' could have justified the detention of individuals fitting into a certain pattern,but that didn't happen. A to be determined set of criteria for EU wide 'temporary detention' with searches of vehicles and appropriate catering for a couple of hours could be a good compromise between upholding individual basic rights of innocent EU civilians and securing the apprehension of real crooks. It's perhaps not necessary to lock such individuals up in prison cells, but just to hold those possible suspects up for a couple of hours in e.g. a restaurant after a thorough search and give law enforcement more time for some extensive scrutiny. Perhaps also a good idea to make sure that a local judge is present at such a 'pre-detention center' after 10-12 hours of such a 'unplanned stop' for those travelers.
Of course it's not possible to provide 100% security, but by willingness to eliminate the errors made in the past and to develop some kind of security routine which also dominated e.g. the aviation industry by timely implementing changes in the rules and regulations after the investigation body releases their conclusions. Given the possibility of other attacks happening in Europe and elsewhere a kind of checklist, similar to those used on airplanes, for such operations has to be developed in order to exclude simple errors from being made which can have serious consequences. Such a pre-planned scenario also excludes the presence of adrenaline flow during such an ongoing operation. Since this is a very serious business there's also no room whatsoever for being as political correct as possible when it comes to staff decision not based entirely on individual skills, but on other factors such as race,religion,gender,whatever. Perhaps it would it be a good idea to set up a division called 'counter-stupidity' with experts as qualified as those who are serving in counter-intelligence departments in order to improve the overall performance of our security apparatus.
An immediate scrutiny of transportation and communication equipment and procedures as well as communication skills and e.g. language capabilities in order to ensure cross-border operations should take place now in order to prevent other catastrophes such as the one happened in Paris. The European people deserve better than this:
On the noticeboard of a small train station in the French Alps: how to react during a #terrorist attack #NewNormal pic.twitter.com/Q0QFJch0I3
— Agnes Poirier (@AgnesCPoirier) January 2, 2016
and where ever there's a shortage of material or manpower there shouldn't be any hesitation to hire those assets from the private sector in order to achieve full operational strength as soon as possible without new lengthy procedures to purchase or even develop new equipment or train personnel. Most important of all is the will of governments to root out incompetence and bureaucracy which might have been tolerable in the past since the East-West divide in Europe was overcome, but the dangers we're facing now don't allow us to be complacent anymore. It's not necessary to make a big fuzz about forced transfers or retirement of staff no longer usable in a new, more efficient security apparatus, but it is sufficient to do it quietly and without any cuts in salaries and/or pensions.
Of course it's not sufficient to concentrate only on avoiding own mistakes, but it shouldn't be forgotten either. Other factors contributing to a reduction of similar attacks shouldn't be dismissed either and that includes a coherent strategy to develop unstable regions of the world economically where new terrorists are presently recruited on the one hand, and a much more efficient way of tackling those evil individuals in those regions on the other.
Nevertheless: I wish all my followers and readers a Happy New Year, combined with the hope that a combination of methods will ensure peace, stability and the absence of terror in all EU member states and beyond !
My best wishes for a healthy & prosperous 2016 !
references:
Paris attacks: Police stopped Salah Abdeslam three times during his escape, getaway driver claims [IBTimes, Dec 20 2015]
¹ Munich massacre [Wikipedia]
² FUNKVERKEHR: Gegen die Regeln [Der Spiegel, Oct 24 1977]
³ Das Fernschreiben 827 kam nicht an [Kölner Stadtanzeiger, Sep 4 2002]
Lufthansa Flight 181 [Wikipedia]
Norway police 'could have stopped Breivik sooner' [BBC, Aug 13 2002]
Anders Breivik massacre: Norway’s worst nightmare [The Guardian, Feb 22 2015]
Garissa University College attack [Wikipedia]
2015 Sousse attacks [Wikipedia]
Police chief admits family used plane needed for terror-hit Garissa rescue mission
[The Telegraph, Apr 15 2016]
Tunisia attack: 'He looked right at me – I thought I was dead,' says tourist [The Guardian, Jun 27 2015]
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. Repeated use of "in the immediate aftermath" in the first two paragraphs, perhaps should reconsider
2. Second paragraph:"...aftermath of the mass killings in Paris it is that there's absolute no...", should be "absolutely"
3. Second paragraph second sentence: should start with "There is"
4. Same paragraph last sentence: "by acting either to slowly", should be "too"
5. Third paragraph: "Every minute or even second that goes by where the attackers are allowed to make use of their lethal weapons in order to inflict as many casualties as possible, it will likely contribute in higher number of casualties" Could be simplified to: Every extra minute that the attackers get to make use of their weapons will likely contribute to higher number of casualties.
12m 12 minutes ago
6. Fifth paragraph: When it comes to effective counter-terrorism measures in the future a thorough look (into) what went wrong in the past is necessary
7m 7 minutes ago
7. The objective is not to put blame on individuals, or even trying (try) to punish them by e.g. drastically reduce (reducing) their pensions, but instead the objective should be to just (just can be removed) learn how to avoid repeating their mistakes made (made can be removed).
13m 13 minutes ago
8. Slightly re-written :As it was described earlier, PC must be eliminated completely from security related issues, especially nowadays, when the classic hostage situations seems to be a thing of the past while thugs with the sole intention to kill as many people of all backgrounds have become the grim reality.
Of course, got it, thanks :)
9. Of course there must also (be) some kind of strategy implemented
12m 12 minutes ago
4 unread messages
10. Re-written: Speaking of PC and security preparations for public events: it's a good start to remind present generations that the casualties of the 1972 Olympic games in Munich could have been minimised, if it hadn't been for the many mistakes made by German authorities from the very beginning.
4m 4 minutes ago
11. Seventh paragraph: "There expertise was" should be "Their"
3m 3 minutes ago
Same sentence: "which instead preferred to pursuit (pursue)
1m 1 minute ago
12. As often in such circumstances the opinions expressed by the experts wasn't (weren't) dismissed with facts and arguments but by ridiculing the author in gatherings of the games' organising committee.
32s
Same sentence: "which instead preferred to pursuit (pursue)
4m 1 minute ago
12. As often in such circumstances the opinions expressed by the experts wasn't (weren't) dismissed with facts and arguments but by ridiculing the author in gatherings of the games' organising committee.
3m 32 seconds ago
13. Re-written: It started with a ridiculous security in place, or rather lack of it, at the entrances, exits and fences of the Olympic village.
Re-written: Same methods were used only days later by the attackers' recon team and finally by the hostage-taker gang consisting
Re-written: One crucial but often overlooked detail: communication errors,
16. There was also some communication mistake also in that operation ( double "also")
This was ninth paragraph
17. Re-written: The need for secure, undetectable mid-flight communication was highlighted once again only a few years later whe
